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Brazil is a proud nation today with a population of approximately 190,000,000.1 It
is hard to imagine that there was ever a time when Brazil was not strong and proud. There
was a time when Brazil was still proud, but not tenibly strong. The state of the Brazilian
military declined steadily after the formation of the republican government and through
the years of the Great War. During the Great War economic hardships provoked civil
unrest at home and contributed to a declaration of war on Germany and an entry into the
conflict on the side of the Allies, albeit as a paper tiger with no teeth.
The Decline of the military
To find the source of Brazil's weakness you need to go back to one of Brazil's
last great victories. In the War of the Triple Alliance against Paraguay which lasted from
1864-1869, Brazil sent into combat 83,000 -en.2 However, when the Contestado
Rebellion was raging in Brazil's South between 1912-1916 Brazil's military had shrunk
to approximately 10,000 men.3 What had happened in the intervening years was politics.
The source of the demise of the Brazilian military can be traced to a speech given by
Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Constant on October 23,1889, before an assemblage of
high-ranking Brazilian officers and visiting officers from the Chilean cruiser Almirante
Cochrane and just three weeks before the end of the reign of Pedro II and the formation
of the republican era. In Constant's speech he declares that'oscientific, moral, and civic
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instruction is far more important than military instruction."4 His theory was well received
by many officers who had similar notions. Young cadets who joined the military after the
formation of the republic in search of a free formal education would be instructed at the
Royal Military Academy in philosophy, theory, and civil engineering but would learn
very little military sciencesand things would remain that way until after The Great War
when the need for a modern military would be made clear.
The Contestado Rebellion was one of several revolts occurring at the end of the
old regime and was a reaction against displacement of many citizens by the construction
of a U.S. owned railway and the rapid European colonization of the area.6 Brazil has
geographical weaknesses along it's inner rim where population density is low and the
ability to project military force is hampered by dense vegetation and a vast distance from
the population centers along the coast. Historically, there were very few roads and no
railways and telegraph lines to these areas. To combat an insurrection of 20,000 men and
women in the Contestado region adjacent to Paraguay, the first order of business for
7,000 regular army personnel was to build roads, telegraph lines, and extend rail service
so as to be able to bring men and supplies to the front and to allow communications with
the capital.T The next step was to actually engage the insurgents. This was hampered by
the fact that entire units would arrive without material. Artillery units would arrive
without horses or wagons. Many machine gun units would arrive without a single
weapon. The ten regiments of the Rio Grande de Sul cavalry arrived without the material
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necessary to equip even one.8
What material did show up was very limited and woefully outdated. Euclides da
Cunha referred to the army's Krupp field pieces as "pyrrhic elephants" when he saw them
used in Canudos in 1896-1897 inaneffort to put down another insurrection;e it is
doubtful that these cannons had improved in 15 years. What is more, these artillery pieces
were not very good to begin with. Friedrich Krupp began selling his weapons in 1855 as
one of the first steel cannons with a rifled barrel. His guns were a major step up from
older smooth-bored bronze cannons. However, they were prone to bursting
unexpectedly.l0 An improved version was put on the market in 1870. However,
considering that this was exactly when the new republic was being formed and that the
new administration had little use for a well-equipped military, it is unlikely that new field
pieces were purchased. It is possible that Cunha saw 40-year-old cannons in action. Also,
uniforms and boots were of inferior quality; they fell apart after just a few days in the
field.rr
Brazil's military well into WWI (the Contestado Rebellion was concluded in
1916) was a joke. The numbers had drastically declined from the War of the Triple
Alliance. What units did exist were poorly equipped, poorly trained, poorly led, and tied
up in an effort to pacify the Brazilian populace. This had been accomplished by a
government that saw no need for a strong military and had no desire to expend the
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Economic Concerns on the Home Front
World War I dramatically affected the economy of Brazil in an adverse manner.
This financial loss had a trickle-down affect that hit the lowest rungs of the ladder the
hardest. This financial burden was the result of wide-spread discontent that eventually led
to a general strike that derailed Brazil's industrial production. While this was not the
cause of Brazil's declaration of war later that year, the sentiments it aroused were
reflected in that same declaration.
To understand the war's impact on the Brazilian economy someone must first
understand the sources of revenue. Brazil's income prior to the war had been generated
predominantly from the export of agricultural goods. A large portion of this was the sale
of rubber and coffee to Europe. At the outbreak of the war Brazil lost all of its trade with
the Central Powers (Austria-Hungary, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire) and the Allies
drastically reduced their imports. Brazil's exports shrank between 1913 and l9l4 by
$92,089,049 from $313,628,078 to $221,539,029, a decline of approximately a 3'd. At the
same time imports declined $160,278,823 from $326,025,51I to $165,746,688, a decline
of almost half.12 This meant that the government was being denied export taxes and
customs dues on imports. This would have been bad by itself, but it happened to come
after years of federal deficits which rose from 22 million dollars in 1908 to 47 million









Rothschild bank in England with the understanding that the money would be furnished by
the governments of England, France, Germany,ltaly, and the United States; this loan fell
through due to the European hostilities.lo To meet the large outstanding debt the
government resorted to printing more money, but when this didn't solve the problem a
loan was obtained from Brazil's foreign creditors to cover the interest on all existing
loans.l5 The Brazilian govemment at this time was praying for some good news.
However, Brazil had one more problem. Brazil's rubber was being added to a market
saturated from rubber grown on plantations in the Far East and the coffee growers were
stuck with the 4,000,000 sacks (out of 12,000,000 generated) that the nations making up
the Central Powers normally purchased.l6
l915 saw an economic shift occurring in Brazil. Commerce continued to a limited
extent with Europe, but the United States had become Brazil's major trade partner.'' Sao
Paulo had already begun to transform itself into an industrial center at the end of the last
century and it's fledgling industrial districts had maintained a growth rate of 8% since
1900.18 The war added a capital goods sector to the clothing, shoe, and processed food
industries that had found homes in a world economy hungry for manufactured goods that
were, for the moment, not being manufactured in Europe. '' The war years of I 91 4- 1 91 8
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do Rio-Branco.27 Also, the Brazilians had their trade fleet of 377 ships to consider.28
At least, there used to be 377 . Germany sank the ship Parana on April 4, 1917 ,
and the TijucaMay 20,lgn.2e After the sinking of the ParanaBraziltried to remain
neutral in the war,30 but then Germany seized all the coffee stored in warehouses in the
cities of Hamburg and Antwerp3r and followed up with the sinking of the Tijuca.It was
only then, on June l, 1917, that Brazil decided to utilize 46 German ships which sat in
Brazilian harbors and had been since the opening of hostilities due to a technicality in the
rules of neutrality dealing with aide rendered to a ship belonging to a combatant nation.32
Also at this time, Brazilian ships begin to travel in convoys protected by the fleets of
Brazil,Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and America.33 However, after two more ships are
sunk Brazil finally decides to declare war on Germany. The president requested a
declaration of war on October 25 andthe congress passed it the next day.3a It is
interesting to note that the sinking of ships appears to be the motivating factor for all of
the Brazilian govemment's moves (and two more ships would be sunk before the war
was over), but Brazil's losses were so small compared to the losses of the combatant
nations in WWII just a few years later. As a comparison, Americalost 674 merchant
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workers (mostly women and children) and lengthened shifts.2r These practices resulted in
an unexpected backlash.
In May, 1917, the Sao Paulo female textile workers of Crespi entered negotiations
with management. The long hours were the root cause of many accidents; the workers
thus struck for safer work conditions.22 Also, the workers demanded a2}Yoraise to offset
increasing food prices.23 Management refused to meet these demands and the women
began a strike that was eventually joined by workers in the city's industrial suburbs, the
industrial centers of the interior, and finally the strike reached Rio de Janeiroon July
l8th.24 Nearly all manufacturing had ground to a halt.
The Politics of War
Brazil's entrance into the war can be seen to arise from dollar diplomacy and as a
means to be seen to be the major power in South America. In l917 the United States
began licensing imports after it revoked its neutrality on February 3,1917.,2s and
countries with non-essential items for sale found themselves in danger of losing their
U.S. markets.26 Brazilhad to decide how far to go with its largest customer. However,
this decision was simplified by the fact that there existed an informal alliance between
Brazil and the U.S. dating back to 1904 due to the efforts of Joaquim Nabuco, the Baron
'' wolf., p. 814.









ships between December,l94l, and July, 1945.35
Conclusion
Brazil is a great nation today, but at the turn of the last century she was anything
but great. The republican government had starved its military and had failed to unifu its
people. The people were up in arms and revolts were springing up in the different corners
of the nation. The world war derailed the Brazilian economy and forced the government
to make some tough decisions about what direction to take the country. In the end, it was
decided to side with the United States, a country that had been cordial to Brazil in the
past and was willing to increase its amount of trade. In the future, this partnership would
deepen and Brazil would partner with the U.s. through WWII, the Korean War, and a
1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic.36
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